In
theory, the positions controlled illegally by China in Truong Sa (Spratly
Islands) in particular and the entire East Sea in general will help strengthen
its ability to control the sea lanes and rapidly deploy armed forces.
 |
Beijing’s construction works on the Gaven Reef
of the Spratly Islands in late March last year was connected with a new
artificial island via a road
|
Control of strategic points
China began massively
upgrading and expanding reefs in Truong Sa in 2014. This process can be
interpreted in a variety of angles. One of them is to create a springboard in
the overall strategy of the Chinese navy, with the basic goal of
"preventing intrusion and access" (A2/AD).
A2/AD, expressed in a
simple way, is pushing the military presence of the United States in the
Asia-Pacific from China as far as possible, in which the East Sea has the key position.
With this strategy,
China is trying to ensure its control primarily in the first island chain (from
southern Japan, through Taiwan and swallowing the East Sea), and then extending
to the second chain of islands (from central Japan, through Guam and down to
the east coast of Indonesia).
Alexander Vuving, a
scholar at the Center for Asia-Pacific Security Studies in Hawaii said, with
the "strategy of artificial islands," the ultimate goal that Beijing
is aiming at is to reshape the geopolitical position in favor of its dominance.
The concept was introduced in an article by this author as "controlling
strategic points", which includes three basic conditions.
The first is to avoid
armed conflict; conflict can occur, but only when there are favorable
conditions. The second is to control as many as the strategic locations in the
East Sea; otherwise, control them quietly and avoid conflict. Third, turning
the strategic points into controlled points that are strong enough to control
the entire area (logistic bases or forward bases).
Due to the big gap in
military power with the US, Chinese will avoid direct conflict with this
country, as well as avoid military confrontation with small countries
around. Therefore, the strategy of "salami slice" and "small
stick" are given priority for the use of fishing boats or paramilitary law
enforcement forces to reduce the risk of conflict.
It can be seen that the
dominant perspective of Vuving - controlling strategic points - has
similarities with Alfred Thayer Mahan, who said that geography will play a
vital role in any naval strategy. Mahan also stressed "geography as a
foundation for strategy."
The objective of maritime and sea control
In the East Sea, the key
lies in China’s selection of the important points to occupy and then expand the
value in geostrategic terms. The illegal seizure of Vietnam's Hoang Sa (Paracel
Islands) in 1974 helps China in control of the northern part of the East Sea.
In Truong Sa, China is illegally holding Fiery Cross Reef, Cuarteron Reef,
Gaven Reef, Johnson South Reef, Subi Reef and most recently Mischief Reef and
Scarborough Reef. According to Vuving, on the map the reefs of Fiery Cross,
Mischief, Scarborough and Woody Island (Hoang Sa) form a quadrangle with a
radius of 250 nautical miles, enough to completely control the East Sea which
is considered the "throat of the international shipping lanes."
According to the
analysis of Vuving, to become the lord over the East Sea, China needs to
develop the islands into a solid foundation which can provide logistics for
fishing boats, marine surveillance ships, submarines and aircraft to dominate
the skies and waters of this region, as well as some lands to establish the
wide economic and security zones.
For example, Woody
Island, the largest island in the Paracels, from an uninhabited sandy beach,
now has 1,000 people. The island has a runway with a length of 2.7 km to serve
the most modern fighters of China, as well as a deep-water port capable of
receiving vessels of 5,000 tons. This can be regarded as China's largest
outpost in the East Sea today.
The construction
activities are taking place in almost all reefs that Beijing occupies, but the
impact is probably the most powerful in Fiery Cross. Currently, the area of
Fiery Cross is twice of Ba Binh (the largest island in the Spratlys before),
and in the future it will have the military capability almost equivalent to
Woody Island.
Militarily, these islands
are the outpost positions consistent with A2/AD. According to the Report of the
Committee for Review of US-China Security and Economic Cooperation, most of the
existing aircraft of China cannot afford long-term operation in the southern
East Sea. This area is about 600 nautical miles away from the base in Hainan,
and more than 400 nautical miles from Woody Island.
Before the expansion
projects are completed, the Chinese Air Force has to use tankers. However,
their tanker aircraft are unable to support large-scale campaigns at a far
distance. Therefore, the artificial island strategy will firstly be a
springboard for this purpose.
More importantly, in the
opinion of some defense experts, these projects will support effectively the
task C4ISR (command and control operations, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) of China over the adjacent
islands and waters. Theoretically, the positions controlled illegally by China
in Truong Sa in particular and the entire East Sea in general will help
strengthen this country's ability to control the sea lanes, sea surveillance
and rapidly deploy the armed forces. China’s Navy will be able to track the
movement of the civilian and military ships across the sea through C4ISR. The
extensive forward and logistics base will be the basis for the deployment of
warships, patrol boats and modern planes.
According to Professor
Robert Beckman (S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies - Nanyang
Technological University) infrastructure improvements to expand reefs and
construction of artificial islands cannot help China change the current legal
status of the reefs.
Firstly, according to
Professor Beckman, if an island is in a state of sovereignty dispute, the
country that occupies the island is unable to enhance its claims by
infrastructure improvement or construction and installation of equipment on the
island.
Secondly, by definition
that "island" is the land area "naturally formed" and
surrounded by the sea and located on the water at high tide, China cannot turn
reefs into islands with full legal regulation (including the territorial
waters, contiguous, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf). The
geological structure is raised above the water at high tide due to
infrastructure improvements only considered an "artificial island".
According to Article 60 of UNCLOS, the artificial islands are not entitled to
legal status for the surrounding waters, and they can only establish safe areas
not greater than 500 meters. So infrastructure improvements cannot change the
legal status of the rocks, though they are raised above the high tide.
Source: vnn
